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I. INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder access to a company’s proxy statement has been 
debated for several decades.1  Currently, shareholders have limited 
access to a company’s proxy statement2 and equally limited ability 
 
         †    J.D. Candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. Augsburg 
College. 
 1. Div. Of Corp. Fin., SEC, Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process 
Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors, (July 15, 2003), at page 12, 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf (last visited April 18, 2004) 
[hereinafter July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report].  The Staff Report states that this issue 
has been debated for more than sixty years.  Id.  For a discussion on the history of 
the shareholder access debate see infra Part II. 
 2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 outlines the procedures for 
shareholders to make proposals to be included in a company’s proxy materials.  17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2003). 
1
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to nominate a candidate for a seat on the board of directors.3  
Director nominations typically are the responsibility of the 
corporate board of directors.4  Recently, the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) proposed 
significant changes to the federal rules that would allow greater 
shareholder access to corporate proxy statements.5  Largely 
supported by shareholders and shareholder activists, interest in this 
rule is arguably a reaction to underperforming stocks and recent 
corporate scandal.6  In order to address what many see as a 
fundamental problem with American corporate governance, the 
Commission has proposed a momentous rule change.7  The 
proposed change would allow specific shareholders or groups of 
shareholders, after the occurrence of certain “triggering” events, to 
nominate a director candidate and have that candidate appear on 
the company’s proxy materials.8 
Implementation of this rule would cause several negative 
 
 3. For a discussion on the current processes for shareholder director 
nomination, see infra Part III. 
 4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (i)(8) (2003) (stating a shareholder proposal is 
excluded “[i]f the proposal relates to an election for membership on the 
company’s board of directors or analogous governing body”). 
 5. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1; Proposed Rule: Security 
Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003) 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm (last visited April 
18, 2004). 
 6. Andrew Countryman, Most Shareholders Back Proxy Access, Study Says, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 24, 2003, at 1 (stating that in a study of more than 1000 shareholders, 
80 percent favored shareholder access to the proxy for nominating board 
candidates); Kathleen Day, SEC Chief Supports Plan to Aid Investors, WASH. POST, July 
16, 2003, at A1 (stating that investors groups claim that corporate wrongdoing 
over the previous eighteen months has “shattered” investor confidence); Deborah 
Solomon, SEC Plans Comprehensive Look at Rules for Proxy Exclusions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
15, 2003, at C9 (stating “[s]hareholder activists . . . have been pushing the SEC to 
consider broader investor access, especially in light of recent corporate scandals”). 
 7. See Andrew Countryman, SEC Moves Toward Revamp of Board Nominations, 
CHI. TRIB. July 16, 2003, at 1 (noting a “historic shift” in the Commission and 
stating that shareholder access has been considered for more than sixty years yet 
this is the closest the Commission has ever come to altering the shareholder-
nomination rules); Interview by National Public Radio with Nell Minow, Editor of 
the Corporate Library, All Things Considered, 2003 WL 5580470 (July 16, 2003) 
(stating “[t]his is far, far greater in import than any of the post-Enron reforms, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, [or] the New York Stock Exchange listing standards”); 
Jonathon Peterson, SEC Acts on Behalf of Investors, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at C3 
(calling shareholder access a “long-cherished goal” and stating that “advocates of 
corporate democracy have sought greater influence over board nominations” for 
decades). 
 8. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 7-9. 
2
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results in American corporations, such as further disenfranchising 
investors, increasing special-interest contests, and escalating the 
difficulty of finding qualified persons to sit on a board.9  
Additionally, the Commission may lack the authority to implement 
such a rule in states like Minnesota.10  Furthermore, sweeping 
corporate governance reforms have been adopted in the last year.11  
These changes in corporate governance law should be allowed 
sufficient time to be fully implemented and their impact assessed 
before any additional, drastic reforms are enacted.12 
This comment will examine the history of the shareholder 
access debate.13  Next, the comment looks at the current rules 
governing the nomination of directors.14  The comment will then 
analyze the Commission’s July 15, 2003 proposal15 and October 14, 
2003 proposed rules.16  The comment will also discuss the possible 
negative effects of the proposed rules if put into practice and 
consider the implications on Minnesota state law.17  Finally, the 
comment will analyze whether a wholesale rule change is 
necessary18 and conclude that the Commission’s proposal should 
not be implemented as a rule at this point in time.19 
II. HISTORY OF THE SHAREHOLDER ACCESS DEBATE 
In 1942, the Commission first addressed the question of 
shareholder access to the proxy for the purpose of nominating 
director candidates.20  The Commission requested that its staff 
analyze the proxy rules and suggest changes.21  The staff proposed 
that “minority stockholders be given an opportunity to use the 
management’s proxy materials in support of their own nominees 
for directorships.”22  However, the Commission did not adopt the 
 
 9. See infra Part VI.B. 
 10. See infra Part VI.C. 
 11. See infra Part VII. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Parts V. 
 17. See infra Part VI. 
 18. See infra Part VII. 
 19. See infra Part VIII. 
 20. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 2 (citing SEC Release no. 
34-3347 (Dec. 18, 1942)). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  More specifically, the proposal would have allowed shareholders to 
3
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1942 proposal allowing shareholder access.23 
Almost thirty-five years later, in 1977, the Commission again 
addressed the issue of shareholder access.24  The Commission 
requested comment on whether “shareholders should have access 
to management’s proxy soliciting materials for the purpose of 
nominating a person of their choice to serve on the board of 
directors.”25  After public hearings were held, the Commission 
proposed and adopted amendments regarding the nomination of 
directors.26  These proposed amendments, however, did not 
address shareholder access to the proxy but instead addressed 
nominating committees.27  The proposal required corporations to 
state whether they have a nominating committee and whether that 
committee will accept shareholder recommendations.28  Once 
again, the Commission did not adopt any rule allowing shareholder 
access to company proxies.29 
The Commission took no further action until 1992, when once 
again the Commission visited shareholder access.30  The 
Commission considered shareholder access in the context of an 
amendment to Exchange Act Rule 14a-4.31  In the enactment of the 
amendment, the Commission discussed the difficulty shareholders 
experience in attempting to affect the nomination process.32  
Despite noting that difficulty, the Commission did not expand 
 
promote their own nominations for director seats and nominations for company 
management. Id. 
 23. Id.  There apparently was no reason given why the shareholder access rule 
was not adopted.  Id. at 2, note 7. 
 24. Id. at 3. 
 25. Id. (citing SEC Release no. 34-13482 (April 28, 1977)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  In a 1980 staff report, the Commission stated because of the 
“emerging concept of nominating committees,” the Commission felt it should not 
propose and adopt a shareholder access rule at that time.  Id.  However, the staff 
report did recommend that the Commission “monitor” the development of 
nominating committees and their “consideration of shareholder 
recommendations.” Id.  The 1980 staff report advised that if the nominating 
committees proved ineffective, “Commission action might be necessary.”  Id. at 3-4. 
 30. Id. at 4 (citing SEC Release No. 34-31326 (Oct. 16, 1992)). 
 31. Id. (discussing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(4) (2002), which states “[a] 
person shall not be deemed to be a bona fide nominee and he shall not be named 
as such unless he has consented to being named in the proxy statement and to 
serve if elected”). 
 32. Id. 
4
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shareholder access to a company’s proxy.33  Instead, the 
Commission revised the bona fide nominee rule34 to allow a 
shareholder to file his or her own proxy statement and proxy 
card.35  However, as discussed below, this is conducted by the 
shareholder or shareholder group at its own expense.36 
Until the proposal and proposed rule that is the subject of this 
comment, the Commission conducted no further public discussion 
on shareholder access after 1992.37 
III. EXISTING AVENUES FOR SHAREHOLDER NOMINATION 
Currently, there are three options for shareholders to 
nominate candidates for directorships.38  Shareholders may 
nominate a candidate at a company’s annual meeting.39 
Shareholders may also recommend a candidate to a company’s 
nominating committee.40  Finally, under the current rules, a 
shareholder may conduct his/her own director election.41 
Minnesota state law does not require that a corporation hold 
an annual meeting.42  However, the statute does carve out an 
exception where no regular meeting43 has been held for a period of 
 
 33. Id. (citing SEC Release No. 34-31326 (Oct. 16, 1992)). The Commission 
stated “[p]roposals to require the company to include shareholder nominees in 
the company’s proxy statement would represent a substantial change in the 
Commission’s proxy rules.  This would essentially mandate a universal ballot 
including both management nominees and independent candidate for board 
seats.”  Id. 
 34. See supra note 31. 
 35. See infra Part III. 
 36. See id. 
 37. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 4. 
 38. Id. at 5. 
 39. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.205 (2003) (stating the election procedures are 
left to be determined by the corporate bylaws and articles of incorporation). 
 40. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 5. 
 41. Id. 
 42. MINN. STAT. § 302A.431, subd. 1 (2003) (“Regular meetings of 
shareholders may be held on an annual or other less frequent periodic basis.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 43. Since Minnesota law does not require an annual shareholder meeting, 
the state no longer uses the term “annual meeting” and instead employs the term 
“regular meeting” in reference to shareholder meetings.  Id.  However it should be 
noted that both the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASDAQ) require that listed companies hold an annual 
shareholders’ meeting in each fiscal year.  N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL § 302.00 (2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/listed/1022221393251. 
html (last visited April 18, 2004); NAT’L ASS’N OF SECS. DEALERS, BY-LAWS OF THE 
NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, INC. Art IV, § 4.11(a) (2003), available at http:// 
5
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fifteen months or greater.44  In such a situation, a shareholder or 
shareholder group that holds more than 3% of a corporation’s 
shares may demand a meeting of the shareholders.45  Regardless of 
whether the corporation scheduled the meeting or its occurrence is 
a result of a shareholder demand, state law dictates that director 
elections are to take place at all regular meetings.46  There are no 
formal state law requirements for director elections at annual 
meetings.47  Provided the corporation’s articles and bylaws do not 
require nominations to be submitted prior to the meeting, a 
shareholder may simply nominate a person from the floor.48  
Practically speaking, many Minnesota companies include provisions 
in their articles of incorporation or bylaws requiring nominations 
for director seats be submitted to the corporation a specified 
period before the meeting.49  In such a situation, a shareholder 
would be required to provide a corporation with notice of her 
intent to nominate a candidate for the board at the next meeting.50 
Despite the relative ease of nominating a candidate for the 
board at a shareholder meeting, proponents of increased 
shareholder access contend that this option is ineffective.51  Since 
many shareholders vote by proxy before a meeting, a candidate 
 
cchwallstreet.com/nasd/nasdviewer.asp?SelectedNode=3&FileName=/nasd/ 
organization/CorporateOrganization.xml#chp_1_3_22 (last visited April 18, 
2004). 
 44. § 302A.431, subd. 2. 
 45. Id.  The statute defines the procedure in which a shareholder or 
shareholder group may demand a regular meeting.  Id.  The demand for a regular 
meeting must be in the form of a written notice to the corporation’s chief 
executive officer or chief financial officer.  Id.  The corporation must respond to 
the demand within thirty days of receipt.  Id.  In response to the demand, the 
board of directors must call and schedule a regular meeting within ninety days 
after receipt of the shareholder demand.  Id.  All expenses incurred are the 
responsibility of the corporation.  Id. 
 46. Id. at subd. 4 (“At each regular meeting of shareholders there shall be an 
election of qualified successors for directors.”). 
 47. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.205 (2003) (stating the election procedures are 
left to corporate bylaws and articles of incorporation). 
 48. See id. 
 49. 18 JOHN H. MATHESON & PHILIP S. GARON, MINN. PRAC. CORP. L. & PRAC. § 
8.35 (2003).  This measure is practiced by Minnesota corporations to deflect 
hostile takeover attempts, and state law does not authorize nor condone this 
practice.  Id.  However, a 1998 decision in Delaware, a state of incorporation for 
many U.S. companies, ruled that a 100-day notice provision in a corporation’s 
bylaws was reasonable.  Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. 728 
A.2d 25, 40 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 50. 18 MATHESON & GARON, supra note 49, § 8.35. 
 51. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 5. 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/9
SUNDQUIST-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  9:11 PM 
2004] SHAREHOLDER NOMINATION OF DIRECTORS 1477 
nominated at a meeting is unlikely to receive the needed amount 
of votes to become a board member.52  Thus, it is argued that 
shareholder nomination at an annual meeting does not provide an 
effective means for candidate nomination to the board.53 
Currently, a shareholder may propose a candidate for a 
directorship to a company’s nominating committee “or group of 
directors fulfilling a similar role.”54  The primary function of the 
nominating committee is to recommend nominees for election as 
directors.55  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states that if a 
company has a nominating committee, the company needs to state 
in its proxy statement whether the “committee will consider 
candidates recommended by security holders” and “describe the 
procedures to be followed” in order to nominate a candidate.56  
Because a company is under no current obligation to disclose why a 
shareholder-recommended candidate was not nominated, this 
process has been criticized by shareholders as being ineffective.57 
To address the perceived ineffectiveness of shareholder 
recommendations to nominating committees, the Commission 
recently proposed additional rules.58  The purpose of these rules is 
to enhance a corporation’s duty to disclose how shareholders may 
propose candidates to a company’s nominating committee, to 
disclose why a shareholder nominee may have not been accepted, 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK: Third Edition, 56 BUS. LAW. 1571, 1608 
(2001) (outlining the membership, function, and criteria for a nominating 
committee). 
 56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(d)(2) (2003). 
 57. Appendix A, Summary of Comments, In Response to the Commission’s 
Solicitation of Public Views Regarding Possible Changes to the Proxy Rules, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47778, 30 (July 15, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/proxycomsum.pdf (last visited April 18, 2004). 
 58. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and 
Communications between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-48301, 68 Fed. Reg. 48, 724 (proposed Aug. 14, 2003) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48301.htm (last visited April 18, 2004).  A 
collateral issue to this comment, the Commission’s proposed changes are 
intended to “enhance the transparency” of a corporation’s nominating committee 
functions.  The proposal would require companies to state in their proxy whether 
they have an existing policy regarding shareholder nominations to the board.  68 
Fed. Reg. at 48, 725-27.  Further, a company would need to disclose in the proxy 
statement the procedure used by the nominating committee in selecting a board 
candidate. Id.  Any rejections of shareholder-nominated candidates would require 
a specific explanation from the company’s nominating committee.  Id. 
7
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and to make corporate nominating committees more “transparent” 
to investors.59  This was the first time the Commission considered 
increasing disclosure regarding nominating committees since 
1978.60  The Commission called this “a critical step in alleviating 
present-day corporate abuses.”61  While realizing the “bigger battle” 
is allowing shareholder access to the proxy, the Commission 
believes this increase in disclosure of nominating committee 
procedures will aid investors in understanding director elections 
and increase the ability for shareholders to nominate board 
candidates.62  This proposal was largely adopted as a final rule on 
November 24, 2003.63 
A shareholder or shareholder group may also elect to run its 
own slate of candidates.64  Under current federal rules, a 
shareholder has the right to request and receive a list of the 
security holders of a corporation.65  Minnesota law grants a similar 
right.66  Under both state and federal law, the request must be in 
writing and the security holder must defray the reasonable 
expenses to be incurred by the corporation.67 
Once a list of shareholders is obtained, an individual or 
shareholder group may distribute its own proxy materials, provided 
 
 59. Id. at 48, 726-27. 
 60. Judith Burns, SEC Gives Preliminary Approval to  Rules on Board Nominations, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2003, at C9 (“SEC disclosure rules for nominating committees 
haven’t been updated since 1978.”).   
 61. Carrie Johnson, SEC Votes to Propose Director Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 
2003, at E3 (quoting SEC Commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid). 
 62. See id. 
 63. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and 
Communications between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Exchange Act 
Release Nos. 33-8340; 34-48825 (Nov. 24, 2003) (to be codified in scattered 
sections of 17 C.F.R.), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8340.htm#P28_2205 (last visited April 18, 2004).  The rule follows the proposal 
briefly outlined in note 58, supra, with one exception.  Fearing a quelling of 
corporate board dialog, the SEC did not require companies to explain why a 
shareholder-recommended candidate was not accepted.  Judith Burns, 
SEC Sets New Rules on Boards, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2003, at C15 (stating the SEC 
“scrapped a plan to require boards” to disclose their reasons for not accepting a 
candidate recommended by shareholders). 
 64. See July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
 65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(2)(ii) (2003) (stating the corporation must 
provide, within five business days, “a reasonably current list of the names, 
addresses and security positions of the record holders”). 
 66. MINN. STAT. § 302A.461, subd. 4(c) (2003). 
 67. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.461, subd. 4, subd. 5 (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
7(a)(2)(i) (2003). 
8
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it complies with the Commission’s proxy rules.68  The shareholder 
is responsible for printing and mailing the proxies.69  The cost of 
undertaking such an endeavor can be quite high.70  Regardless, 
shareholders and shareholder groups have the legal right to run 
their own proxy contest and nominate their candidate(s) for the 
board.71  Thus, shareholders currently have a process for the 
nomination of board candidates.72 
IV. THE SEC PROPOSALS FOR SHAREHOLDER ACCESS 
A.  Shareholder Access to the Proxy Statement 
On April 14, 2003, Securities and Exchange Commission 
Chairman William Donaldson stated “the time has come for a 
thorough review of the proxy rules and regulations to ensure that 
they are serving the best interests of today’s investors, while at the 
same time, fostering sound corporate governance and transparent 
business practices.”73  The Commission announced that it had 
directed the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Division”) to 
conduct a full review of the proxy rules.74  Along with solicitation of 
proxies for director elections, contests for corporate control, and 
disclosure requirements, the Commission directed the Division to 
review the current proxy rules and regulations regarding the 
procedures for nominating and electing corporate directors.75  The 
Commission asked the Division to consult with all interested 
parties, including “representatives of pension funds, shareholder 
advocacy groups, and representatives from the business and legal 
communities.”76  The Commission requested the Division provide 
 
 68. See July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 5.  The rules for 
soliciting proxy materials and the elaborate scheme of disclosure obligations 
found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are very detailed and outside the 
scope of this comment. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Lewis Braham, Bring Democracy to Boardroom Elections, BUS. WK., Oct. 21, 
2002, at 126.  One estimate puts the proxy cost at $2 per shareholder.  Id.  In a 
large corporation, the cost to solicit a proxy could easily go over $1 million.  Id. 
 71. See July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 5. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Commission to Review Current Proxy Rules and Regulations to Improve 
Corporate Democracy, Press Release No. 2003-46 (Apr. 14, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-46.htm (last visited April 18, 2004). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
9
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any recommendations for changes to the proxy rules to the 
Commission by July 15, 2003.77 
On May 1, 2003, the Commission solicited public comment on 
the Division’s review of the proxy rules regulating the nomination 
and election of directors.78  Of the 690 comments received, the 
majority were made by individuals.79  Accordingly, the overall 
majority of comments were in support of the proposal of giving 
shareholders access to corporate proxies to nominate directors.80  
Among those that opposed the proposal were corporations and 
corporate executives as well as the majority of law firms and 
individual attorneys.81 
On July 15, 2003, the Commission published “Staff Report: 
Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and 
Election of Directors.”82  The Commission listed “alternatives” to 
increase shareholder involvement in the nomination and election 
of directors.83  Of the alternatives discussed by the Commission, the 
proposal to grant shareholders direct access to the proxy statement 
garnered the most attention.84 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. A full summary of the comments received by the Commission is available 
at Appendix A, Summary of Comments, In Response to the Commission’s 
Solicitation of Public Views Regarding Possible Changes to the Proxy Rules, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47778 (July 15, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/proxycomsum.pdf (last visited April 18, 2004). 
 79. Id. at 21.  The categorization of the comments are as follows: 424 
individuals; 165 unions, pension funds, institutional investors, and investor 
associations; twenty-four social, environmental, and religious funds; eighteen law 
firms and attorneys; sixteen associations; ten corporations and corporate 
executives; ten shareholder resource providers; eight investment advisers and 
managers; five academics; five other shareholder groups; two governmental 
representatives; and three miscellaneous comments. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1. 
 83. Id. at 7.  The SEC discusses five alternatives to accomplish increased 
shareholder involvement.  Id.  Regarding shareholder nominations, the 
Commission considered requiring companies to include shareholder nominees in 
the proxy materials, requiring companies to deliver nominating shareholder proxy 
cards with company proxy materials, and amending the Securities Exchange of 
1934, Rule 14a-8 to allow for shareholder proposals regarding director 
nomination.  Id.  The Commission also considered expanding disclosure 
regarding nominating committees and the nomination process, including the 
consideration of candidates recommended by shareholders, and also discussed 
expanding shareholder access to the board as well as direct communications with 
the boards of directors.  Id.  This comment will focus on the proposed 
requirements of shareholder nominee inclusion in company proxies.  Id. 
 84. Id. 
10
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Simply stated, this alternative would require companies to 
include shareholder nominees on its proxy card.85  Suggested 
information to be included on the proxy card would be 
biographical information on the candidate and arguments for and 
against each of the company’s and nominating shareholder’s 
candidates.86  The Commission noted that any and all soliciting 
materials would continue to be filed electronically.87  Further, the 
Commission observed, all communication would still be subject to 
the bar on false and misleading statements found in Exchange Act 
Rule 14a-9.88 
The Commission stated two issues that require consideration 
before enacting any shareholder access rule: when shareholder 
access may be granted and who may qualify to gain access.89  In 
considering when a shareholder or group of shareholders shall be 
given access to a proxy for the purpose of director nomination, the 
Commission discussed “triggering events” that would need to occur 
prior to the granting of shareholder access.90  The Commission 
acknowledged that a triggering event might add additional 
complexity to the rule.91  However, the Commission stated that 
limiting the use of the shareholder access rule to these 
circumstances would best serve the clear purpose of the rule: to 
increase shareholder participation in the election of directors.92 
One triggering event discussed would be where a company 
failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received a majority of 
votes.93  A related possible triggering event is an election where a 
director candidate received a significant amount of abstention or 
“withhold” votes.94  In the election of directors, shareholders may 
vote or withhold a vote for each nominee.95  Unlike other matters 
voted on by shareholders where one may vote for, against, or 
abstain, election voting is simply a vote cast for the nominee or an 
 
 85. Id. at 7. 
 86. Id.  It is also suggested by the Commission that arguments for or against 
may need to be in word-limited form or outside of the proxy entirely—for 
instance, on one or more designated websites. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2003)). 
 89. Id. at 8. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 2. 
 93. Id. at 9. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2). 
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abstention.96  Accordingly, director elections are generally 
conducted under plurality voting,97 where the candidate with the 
greatest number of votes—but not necessarily a majority—is 
elected.98  In a situation where a director candidate received a 
significant amount of “withhold” votes but nonetheless still 
established a plurality, the Commission suggests this to be a 
triggering event that would invoke the shareholder access rule.99 
Another triggering event discussed by the Commission was the 
approval of a shareholder proposal to activate the shareholder 
access rule.100  If a shareholder did not believe the proxy process 
had been effective, the July 15, 2003 Staff Report suggested the 
shareholder could submit a proposal via Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 
requesting that the corporation comply with the shareholder access 
procedure.101 
In the Staff Report, the Commission briefly discussed other 
triggering events such as poor economic performance,102 
sanctioning of the corporation by the Commission, or indictments 
of corporate officers on criminal charges.103  However, the 
Commission stated that any triggering event should be closely 
linked to evidence of a failing proxy process.104 
Equally important to the determination of when shareholder 
access should become available is the issue of who should qualify to 
receive such access.105  While the Commission recommended that 
there be specific minimum standards regarding shareholders who 
have access to a proxy for nomination purposes, those specific 
standards were not defined in the July 15 proposal.106  Those who 
commented on the proposed rule made recommendations that 
ranged from all shareholders having access to only shareholders 
 
 96. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 8. 
 97. However, Minnesota is unique in that it requires a majority vote in the 
election of directors.  See infra note 230. 
 98. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 12 n.25. 
 99. Id. at 9. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 9, note 20.  The Commission stated that this type of triggering event 
would require a revision of the Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 in order to enable 
shareholders to obtain the capacity to submit such a proposal.  A discussion of the 
revision of Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 can be found infra Part IV.B. 
 102. Id. at 9. 
 103. Id. at 9, note 21. 
 104. Id. at 9. 
 105. Id. (emphasis added). 
 106. Id. at 32-33. 
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with substantial share ownership having access.107  The argument 
for having no share-ownership threshold put forth by many was 
that large shareholders already have resources to exercise their 
rights using existing rules.108  At the same time, those with larger 
ownership contended that they have a greater stake in the company 
and thus have a greater interest in the use of company funds that 
would result in the shareholder nomination process.109  
Throughout this debate, the ownership thresholds for shareholder 
access most frequently discussed were 3% and 5%.110  Also discussed 
was the length of time a shareholder has owned voting stock.111  
Length of ownership suggestions ranged from one year to at least 
three years.112  As stated above, the Commission declared that some 
sort of criteria will need to be implemented.113 
Two other alternatives were discussed in the Staff Report that, 
while somewhat outside the scope of this comment, merit some 
discussion.114 
B.  Two Alternatives to Shareholder Access 
The Commission discussed two alternatives to shareholder 
access.  The first alternative is similar to a requirement that 
companies include shareholder nominees in company proxy 
materials.115  The Commission discussed delivering separate, 
nominating shareholders’ proxy cards along with company proxy 
 
 107. Id. at 9-10 
 108. Id. at 10.  Current nomination processes available to shareholders were 
discussed supra Part III.  One such process is a shareholder-conducted election.  
This can be an expensive endeavor.  Thus the minority shareholders argue that 
large shareholder or shareholder groups have the resources to conduct such an 
election and therefore are not the group that needs increased access to the proxy. 
 109. Id.  Companies would be required to fund the listing of shareholder 
nominees on the proxy materials.  Since this cost will impact the company and 
thus the largest shareholders, that group feels they should have the greatest 
control over exactly who is placed on the proxy ballot. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 9.  In the proposed rule the Commission narrowed this criteria by 
stating that only shareholders or shareholder groups owning at least 5% of 
company’s shares, for at least two years prior to the triggering event, can nominate 
a candidate for the next director election. For a discussion on the proposed rule, 
see infra Part V. 
 114. Id. at 16, 28. 
 115. Id. at 16. 
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materials.116  The American Bar Association’s Task Force on 
Shareholder Proposals proposed this variation on shareholder 
access.117  This differs from the alternative outlined above where a 
company would be required to include a shareholder nominee on 
the company’s proxy material.118  This alternative would require a 
company to include a separate nominating shareholder’s proxy 
card together with the company’s own proxy card.119  This 
occurrence could also be subject to a triggering event.120  Directives 
for the rule include a requirement for a company “to note briefly 
in its proxy materials that a shareholder or shareholder group had 
nominated a candidate to board of directors, that the shareholder’s 
proxy card is included in the company’s mailing, and that 
additional disclosure . . . may be found on a specified website.”121 
While unlike the alternative discussed above where the 
shareholder nominees would actually appear on the company’s 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Comments of Task Force on Shareholder Proposals, Section of Business 
Law of the American Bar Association (June 13, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/aba061303.htm (last visited April 18, 
2004) [hereinafter ABA Comment].  The thirty-one-page comment written by the 
Task Force in response to the Commission’s May 1, 2003, solicitation for comment 
is mainly analytical in nature.  The Task Force states that due to the early 
procedural stage of the Commission’s examination of shareholder access, no 
specific recommendations were given.  Instead, the ABA outlines what it believes 
to be fundamental policy issues, such as the need for a new director selection 
system, eligibility requirements, and viewpoints for and against the expansion of 
shareholder access.  The Task Force goes on to discuss some alternatives to the 
shareholder access proposals.  Along with allowing shareholders to utilize the 
company’s proxy mailings to solicit their own candidates, the Task Force also looks 
at a revision of Exchange Act Rule 14a-8.  Finally, the Task Force examines the 
Commission’s authority to expand shareholder access. 
 118. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 16. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  The SEC did not outline any specific triggering events that would 
require a company to include a nominating shareholder’s proxy card along with 
the company’s proxy.  Id.  It is assumed that the SEC would subject such a rule to 
the same triggering events outlined supra Part IV.A. 
 121. Id.  The SEC notes that any disclosure regarding the nomination of 
shareholder candidates, including campaigning for shareholder nominees, would 
appear on a nominating shareholders’ website.  Additionally, all disclosures 
related to nominating shareholders would be filed electronically with the 
Commission.  Id.  The Commission also states that a rule similarly could require 
that the company’s soliciting materials be listed on the company’s website.  Id.  
Regardless of where the information is listed and who lists it, the Commission 
states that all communications related to shareholder nominees would be subject 
to the prohibition against false and misleading statements as prescribed by 
Exchange Act Rule 14a-9.  Id. 
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proxy materials, the company would still be required to absorb the 
cost of mailing the nominating shareholder’s proxy card.122  
Additionally, a current rule requires that any solicitation delivered 
to a shareholder be preceded by or concurrent with the delivery of 
a definitive proxy statement.123  This alternative could cause a 
shareholder to receive a nominating shareholder’s proxy card 
without first, or at least concurrently, receiving a proxy statement 
disclosure about the shareholder nominee.124  Thus, if 
implemented, this alternative would need to provide shareholders 
with the required disclosure, enabling an informed decision when 
casting a vote for a shareholder candidate or a board candidate.125  
As discussed above, the Commission suggests a designated website 
where relevant information could be found regarding the 
nominees.126 
An additional alternative discussed by the Commission was the 
revision of Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(8).127  This rule 
currently allows companies to exclude a shareholder proposal that 
“relates to an election for membership on the company’s board of 
directors or analogous governing body.”128  The Commission has 
ruled that a company may exclude a shareholder proposal if such a 
proposal may result in an election contest.129 
The Commission in the Staff Report of July 15, 2003 discussed 
the alternatives to this rule.130  The Commission stated two possible 
options: establish a new analysis of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) or amend the 
 
 122. Id.  The Commission notes that currently under Exchange Act Rule 14a-7, 
a company may choose to mail a shareholder’s proxy materials instead of 
providing the nominating shareholder with a mailing list of current shareholders.  
Id. at 16, n.27.  However, this mailing is by choice and has two major distinctions 
over the current proposal.  Id.  First, the shareholder’s proxy materials would be 
mailed separately from the company’s proxy.  Id.  Second, the cost of the mailing 
would be charged to the shareholder and not absorbed by the company.  Id. 
 123. Id. at 17 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(f) (2002)).  This rule states “[n]o 
person conducting a solicitation subject to this regulation shall deliver a form of 
proxy, consent or authorization to any security holder unless the security holder 
concurrently receives, or has previously received, a definitive proxy statement that 
has been filed with the Commission pursuant to § 240.14a-6(b).”  17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-4(f) (2002)). 
 124. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 17. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 28. 
 128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8). 
 129. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 28. 
 130. Id. 
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rule to allow shareholders to access a company’s proxy.131  The 
Commission suggests that under either an amendment or a change 
in analysis to the rule, state law would be implicated.132  State law 
requires shareholder proposals to be voted on by the board.133  
Thus, a change to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) would need to provide an 
exemption for any proposal, such as a shareholder nomination, 
that would violate state law.134  The Commission notes that the rule 
could still be utilized to exclude certain proposals, “such as those 
that nominate a particular person to the board,” or “proposals that 
seek to remove current directors from the board,” as well as 
proposals to attempt to affect the outcome of a director election.135 
V. THE PROPOSED RULE 
On October 14, 2003 the Commission issued a proposed set of 
rules that put the proposal outlined above into a rule format.136  
Over more than sixty years of debate, this is the first time the 
concept of allowing shareholder nomination has made it to the 
proposed rule stage.137  While the Commission originally had 
planned on implementation of the rule by the 2004 proxy season, 
the SEC recently held a roundtable discussion to further discuss the 
proposed rule and appears to be taking no action regarding the 
rule until at least early spring 2004.138 
The October 14, 2003 proposed rule is more than 100 pages 
long, contains more than 200 footnotes, and puts forward more 
than 300 separate questions posed to the potential commenter.139  
However, the proposed rule does not appear to stray far from the 
July 15, 2003 proposal discussed at length above.140  One of two 
triggering events, discussed in the July 15 proposal and fine-tuned 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Id.  For a discussion on state law, see infra Part VI.C. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/34-48626.htm (last visited April 18, 2004) [hereinafter October 14, 2003 
Proposed Rule]. 
 137. See supra Part II. 
 138. Notice of Roundtable Discussion Regarding Proposed Rules Relating to 
Security Holder Director Nominations, Feb. 9, 2004, at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2004-15.htm (last visited April 18, 2004). 
 139. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136. 
 140. See id. 
16
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in the October 14 proposed rule, must occur before shareholders 
will have the option to nominate a director candidate.141  The first 
triggering event outlined by the Commission is if at least 35% of 
the shares voted are withheld from a particular board nominee.142  
That is, if at least one of the board’s candidates receives “withhold 
votes” from 35% or more of the voting shares at an annual 
meeting, shareholder nomination would be considered 
“triggered.”143  Alternatively, under the proposed rule, shareholders 
may also trigger the right to nominate a candidate if a 1% 
shareholder, or a group constituting 1% of share ownership that 
has owned shares of the company’s stock for at least one year, 
proposes the right to nominate a director candidate.144  Once that 
event occurs, a majority of voting shareholders must approve the 
proposal to nominate.145 
The Commission also put forth a third triggering event to 
solicit public comment: failure by a company to act on a 
shareholder proposal that receives a majority vote.146  The 
Commission devoted far less discussion to this possible third 
triggering event.147  The Commission expressed concern over 
whether or not “the link between the possible ineffectiveness of, or 
dissatisfaction with, a company’s proxy process and this possible 
nomination procedure triggering event is more indirect than in the 
case of the two nominating process triggering events proposed 
[above].”148  The Commission expressed further concern over the 
intricacies of the rule, relating to the determination of whether a 
shareholder proposal was actually implemented, potentially causing 
time-consuming disputes.149 
After leaving the issue somewhat unsettled in the July 15 
proposal discussed above, the Commission discussed exactly who 
could nominate a director.150  Once one of the triggering events 
 
 141. Id. at Part II.A.3.a. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  The reality of a 35% withhold vote was recently evidenced by the 43% 
withhold vote for Walt Disney CEO and ex-Chairman Michael Eisner. Dennis K. 
Berman & Debra Solomon, Death by Proxy? Vote on Eisner Causes Stir, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 4, 2004 at C5. 
 144. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136, at Part II.A.3.a. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at Part II.A.3.b. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at Part II.A.5.a. 
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outlined above occurs, any shareholder or group of shareholders 
holding at least 5% of a company’s shares for at least two years 
prior to the triggering event, can propose a candidate for the next 
director election.151  If more than one shareholder or group of 
shareholders propose candidates, the candidate for largest holder 
or group will be nominated.152 
Once the shareholder access rule has been triggered, the 
Commission also proposed a limitation on how many shareholder 
nominees would be permitted.153  For a company that has a board 
composed of eight or fewer directors, the proposed rule calls for 
one shareholder nominee to be included on the proxy.154  Under 
the proposed rule, a company that has more than eight but fewer 
than twenty directors would be required to include two shareholder 
nominees.155  If the board consists of twenty or more members, 
three nominees would be required.156  To put the above quotas into 
perspective, the vast majority of public companies’ boards are made 
up of fewer than twenty directors, with an overall median board 
size of nine.157 
Comments for the October 14, 2003 proposed rule were due 
by December 22, 2003.158  The response was extraordinary.  In the 
history of the Securities and Exchange Commission, no proposed 
rule has generated more comment letters.159  The Commission 
received a record 12,000-plus comment letters regarding the 
proposed rule.160  It should be noted, however, that almost 9500 of 
those comment letters were form letters generated by large, 
unidentified lobby organizations in favor of the proposed rule.161 
 
 151. Id.  Thus any actual shareholder nomination would take place the year 
following the triggering event. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at Part II.A.7.a. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at note 114 (stating that in a sample 1439 public companies, 
approximately 42% of the surveyed companies had eight or fewer directors and 
approximately 58% were composed of nine to nineteen directors). 
 158. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136. 
 159. Adrian Michaels, SEC Move to Boost Power of Shareholders Wins Support, FIN. 
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003 at 1 (stating the Commission “received a record number of 
comments”). 
 160. Id. (stating that previously the Commission had received 7000 comment 
letters on a proposal that would force institutional investors to disclose their voting 
records). 
 161. Id. 
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At the time of this writing,162 the Commission had yet to make 
any final decisions regarding the proposed rule, and the SEC’s five 
commissioners appear to be “divided on the issue.”163  On March 
10, 2004, the Commission held a roundtable discussion on the 
proposed shareholder nomination rule.  The daylong discussion 
includes a comment period extending through the end of March 
2004.164  Accordingly, it appears the Commission will not be acting 
on the proposed rule until April 2004 at the earliest.165 
VI. ANALYSIS 
A.  The Misnomer of Corporate Democracy 
Those who submitted comments in favor of increased 
shareholder access to the proxy often use the concept of “corporate 
democracy” as their rally cry.166  In a country where the principle of 
democracy is held in the highest esteem, it is easy to understand 
why many believe democracy should extend to the selection of 
those who inhabit the boardroom.167  Yet a strong argument can be 
made that this is a misplaced analogy and the common notion of 
democracy is not synonymous with the idea of “corporate 
 
 162. March 11, 2004. 
 163. Joshua Chafin & Adrian Michaels, Proposals on Proxies Spark Disagreement, 
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at 17. 
 164. See supra note 138. 
 165. See Andrew Countryman, Vote on Shareholder Nominations Weeks Away, 
Regulators Say, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2004, at A3, available at 2004 WL 6924830 
(stating that due to the complexity of the rule, it may be “several weeks” before the 
SEC takes any action). 
 166. See Comments of Institutional Shareholder Services (June 13, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/iss061303.htm (last visited April 18, 
2004) (stating “[a]ny democracy is only as robust as its electoral process” and 
“[e]lections at U.S. corporations lack several attributes of any good democratic 
system”); Comments of State of Wisconsin Investment Board (June 12, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/swib061203.htm (last visited April 18, 
2004) (suggesting the Commission takes steps toward more competitive board 
elections in the name of corporate democracy); Comments of Trillium Asset 
Management Corporation (June 12, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/ 
s71003/trilliumamc061203.htm (last visited April 18, 2004) (stating it is time for 
the Commission to make changes so that corporate democracy will no longer be 
an “oxymoron”); Comments of Council of Institutional Investors (May 10, 2003), 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/cii051003.htm (last visited April 18, 
2004) (likening corporate board members to elected government officials who 
thus are subject to the rules of democracy). 
 167. See supra note 166. 
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democracy.”168 
Foremost among the differences between government 
elections and corporate board of director elections is the issue of 
duty.169  In an election for a board seat, the board has a fiduciary 
duty to nominate candidates that will act in the best interest of the 
corporation.170  Distinguish that duty from an election for a 
government official, where the voter may vote with her sole 
interests in mind.171  The fiduciary duty of board members, to 
nominate director candidates that benefit the entire corporation 
and not just the interests of one shareholder or shareholder group, 
is of utmost importance to corporate survival.172  Since shareholders 
have no duty to the corporation, if the shareholder nomination 
proposal becomes a rule, a shareholder would be free to nominate 
whomever she desires.173  Without the legal responsibility charged 
to directors by law in the nominations of director candidates, 
shareholders could nominate candidates with their sole interests in 
mind, without any recourse or accountability to the corporation or 
the body of shareholders.174 
Another difference to note when distinguishing corporate 
democracy from political democracy is the ability of a shareholder 
to take the “Wall Street Walk.”175  There is no requirement for 
anyone to be a shareholder.176  Unlike a voter in a governmental 
election, if a shareholder is unhappy with a company for any 
reason, she may sell her stock and cease contact with that 
corporation.177  It is important to remember that a corporation is 
 
 168. ABA Comment, supra note 117 (stating that a corporation is not a 
political entity). 
 169. Comments of American Society of Corporate Secretaries (June 13, 2003), 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/ascs061303.htm (last visited April 18, 
2004) (stating the most fundamental difference between corporate and 
governmental elections is the duty that the two different electorates owe). 
 170. Ray v. Homewood Hosp., 223 Minn. 440, 444, 27 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1947) 
(“Directors may not agree to exercise their official duties for the benefit of any 
other individual or interest other than the corporation itself . . .”). 
 171. Comments of American Society of Corporate Secretaries (June 13, 2003), 
supra note 169. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Constance A. Bagley & Karen L. Page, The Devil Made Me Do It: Replacing 
Corporate Directors’ Veil of Secrecy with the Mantle of Stewardship, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
897, 909 (1999) (defining the “Wall Street Walk” as the ability of a shareholder to 
sell her stock in a company in which she is dissatisfied). 
 176. ABA Comment, supra note 117. 
 177. Bagley & Page, supra note 175, at 909. 
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an “economic entity whose function is to create wealth for its 
owners.”178  A corporation is not a political body in which the lack 
of voting power to nominate a candidate would create 
oppression.179  In the case of the nomination of a board candidate, 
if a shareholder is not happy, she may simply sell her shares.180 
A fundamental piece of the discussion of corporate democracy 
is the debate over who actually “owns” a corporation.  The 
commonly accepted answer to that question is that the 
shareholders are the rightful owners.181  Those who commented on 
the proposal discuss ownership of a corporation as being akin to 
owning actual property.182  Along with this notion is the idea that a 
property owner may do whatever she wants with her property, 
provided she does not harm any third parties.183  The argument 
follows that a corporation must do whatever its owners, the 
shareholders, wish.184  Yet, what do shareholders actually own?  A 
share of stock is a financial interest in a corporation, not ownership 
of a corporation’s assets or property.185  There are other parties 
involved—employees, customers, creditors, and communities—that 
all have a strong interest in the corporation’s survival.186  
Shareholder interest lies in financial gain and thus may or may not 
have concern for the corporation’s long-term success.187  While the 
common belief may be that the shareholders “own” the 
corporation, it is very important to realize that there are other 
interests at stake along with the shareholders’ financial interest.188  
Granting a significant amount of control to shareholders under the 
 
 178. ABA Comment, supra note 117. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248 (1999) (stating that many “legal scholars” feel that 
shareholders are the owners of a corporation). 
 182. Comments of the Council of Institutional Investors (May 10, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/cii051003.htm (last visited April 18, 
2004) (stating that “wealth is maximized when owners . . . care for their own 
property” and thus shareholders should be able to control what they own). 
 183. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenbaum, A New System of Corporate 
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 191 (1991). 
 184. Id. at 191-92. 
 185. Id. at 193-94. 
 186. Id. at 192. 
 187. For a discussion of the fiduciary duty of a director, see supra Part VI.A. 
 188. Bill George, Why It’s Hard to Do What’s Right . . . , FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 2003, 
at 95 (placing shareholder concerns after the concerns of employees and 
customers). 
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notion that they are “owners” may place the focus upon short-term 
financial gain at the risk of the long-term growth and sustainability 
of a corporation.189 
There is a tremendous amount of misplaced emotion behind 
the concept of corporate democracy.190  One commenter even went 
so far as to liken current director elections to elections “held today 
in North Korea, Iraq, Cuba and many other countries where a 
dictatorship style of government still exists.”191  This notion is 
greatly misguided.  Analysis of the proposal shows that it is not the 
small, private investor who will be given a voice by this proposed 
rule.192  Instead, it is a few large shareholders or shareholder groups 
who will receive these rights.193  It is also significant to remember 
that most of the individually held stock in this country is owned by 
the wealthiest citizens.194  While the goal of the proposal is to 
increase “shareholder participation in the process related to 
elections”195 and thus improve corporate governance, the proposal 
actually could further disenfranchise a large number of smaller, 
non-institutional shareholders.196  By granting these special rights to 
large shareholders who, unlike directors, have no duty to act in the 
best interest of all shareholders, the proposal actually brings 
corporate America farther from the goal of corporate democracy. 
 
 189. Richard A. Booth, Who Owns a Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 147, 177 (2001) (stating “[t]he danger is that too much deference to 
stockholder interest may get in the way of transactions that otherwise make sense 
and should go forward.”). 
 190. Comments of American Society of Corporate Secretaries (June 13, 2003), 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/ascs061303.htm (last visited April 18, 
2004) (urging the Commission to be “cautious of the emotionally charged nature” 
of the term “corporate democracy”). 
 191. Comments of Gary L. Nystrom (May 30, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/glnystrom053003.htm (last visited April 
18, 2004). 
 192. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136, at Part II.A.5.a (stating 
the right to nominate would be given to shareholders holding more than 5% of 
the shares of a company). 
 193. See id. 
 194. Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 
310 n.115 (1998) (stating the wealthiest 10% in the United States own almost 90% 
of all stock). 
 195. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 2. 
 196. This begs the question: If the proposal only grants the power to nominate 
to shareholders of 5%, what about the other 95%? 
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B.  Policy Issues 
One of the biggest concerns related to the enactment of a 
shareholder access rule is the threat that special interest groups 
might attain a position on the board.197  A group of shareholders or 
even a single shareholder that owns 5% of a company’s shares 
would have the power to nominate a director.198  It is possible that 
this proposal, through a nominating shareholder wanting to gain a 
voice on the board to advance his concern, could give additional 
power to special interest groups.199  For example, if a group wanted 
to advance its agenda, it may attempt to nominate a candidate who 
would represent its cause in the boardroom rather than the 
broader interest of the corporation.200  If elected, that candidate 
would have what many see as a conflict of interest.201  Directors have 
a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the corporation as a 
whole.202  However, since a director candidate needs at least a 
plurality vote to be elected, even a special-interest director would 
join the board only if she received approval from a large group of 
shareholders.203  In reality, the argument of a special interest 
candidate being elected and carrying that agenda into the 
boardroom may not be that large of a threat.  Nevertheless, the 
threat of special interest directors leads to another policy concern 
regarding shareholder access. 
While the fact that a director needs a plurality vote to be 
 
 197. See Comments of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (June 
13, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/tfpcprabny061303.htm# 
P39_25962 (last visited April 18, 2004) (stating the adoption of the proposal would 
“facilitate the election of ‘special interest’ directors”); Comments of the 
Committee of Securities Regulation of the Business Law Section of the New York 
State Bar Association (June 13, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/ 
scrblsnysba061303.htm (last visited April 18, 2004) (claiming the proposal could 
“lead to directors representing special interest which would run counter to the 
initiatives for independent boards”); Comments of Harvard University (June 6, 
2003), at  http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/harvard060603.htm (last 
visited April 18, 2004) (warning that mechanisms should be put in place that 
prohibit the election of any special interest directors). 
 198. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136. 
 199. See supra note 197. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Comments of Harvard University (June 6, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/other/s71003/harvard060603.htm (last visited April 18, 2004). 
 202. For a discussion of the fiduciary duty of a director, see supra Part VI.A. 
 203. Comments of Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk (June 13, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/labebchuk061303.htm (last visited April 
18, 2004). 
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elected may quell the special interest argument, the threat of a 
special interest causing coercion by threatening a director 
nomination is real.204  In order to advance an agenda, a 5% 
shareholder may threaten to nominate a candidate to the board 
who carries that special interest.205  True, the candidate would still 
need to obtain at least a plurality vote, depending on the state, 
before being elected.206  Nonetheless, under the proposal a 
corporation would be forced to absorb the cost of including the 
candidate’s name on the proxy.207  While this threat is presently 
available to shareholders interested in nominating a candidate, the 
key difference is that currently the corporation does not fund a 
proxy contest lodged by a shareholder.208  If the proposal is passed 
into law, it could force corporations to engage in and fund proxy 
contests each year.209  Ironically, since a company may now need to 
fund the contest, this could shift the cost of a shareholder proxy 
contest from a few shareholders that lodge the contest to all 
shareholders.210 Conceivably, in order to avoid this cost burden, a 
corporation’s board of directors may give greater weight to a 
special interest proposal.211  This may or may not be in the best 
interest of the corporation as a whole.212 
Another concern among opponents of the proposed rule is 
the increasing difficulty in finding qualified persons to sit on a 
corporate board.213  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes) and recent 
 
 204. Comments of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz (June 11, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/wachtell061103.htm (last visited April 
18, 2004) (stating that, even under the current rules, the “mere threat of a proxy 
contest” can force a board to act). 
 205. See supra note 197. 
 206. A plurality vote is needed for director elections in most states. However, 
Minnesota law requires a majority.  MINN. STAT. § 302A.437 (2003) (stating any 
action by the shareholders requires a majority vote). 
 207. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 9. 
 208. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.461, subd. 4, subd. 5 (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
7(a)(2)(i) (2003). 
 209. Comments of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz (June 11, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/wachtell061103.htm (last visited April 
18, 2004) (stating that proxy contests can be very “disruptive” to a corporation). 
 210. Comments of the Committee of Securities Regulation of the Business Law 
Section of the New York State Bar Association (June 13, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/scrblsnysba061303.htm (last visited April 
18, 2004). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Directors are under a duty to act in the best interest of the corporation.  
See supra Part VI.A. 
 213. See Comments of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (June 
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corporate scandal has subjected directors to a significant increase 
in public scrutiny.214  Finding qualified candidates to fill board 
positions that satisfy the increased requirements under Sarbanes is 
becoming difficult.215  It can now take twice as long to find a 
qualified candidate as it did a decade ago.216  It is estimated that 
90% of qualified board candidates already turn down director 
positions for fear of being sued.217  A qualified director candidate 
may be less likely to agree to board service given the greater 
possibility of a proxy contest creating contentious elections and 
“risk to reputation in the event of a loss.”218  Again, by not having 
the most qualified people on the board, this may sacrifice the best 
interest of the corporation to satisfy the interest of a few.219 
Finally, it is important to remember the corporate scandals 
that the shareholder access proposal addressed were the improper 
actions of only a few companies, namely Enron and WorldCom.220  
However, the shareholder access proposal will affect all public 
companies, for better or worse.221  Thus hundreds, perhaps 
thousands,222 of public companies across the nation that are 
currently conducting business ethically and responsibly will be 
punished for the acts of a few.223 
 
13, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/tfpcprabny061303. 
htm#P39_25962 (last visited April 18, 2004). 
 214. Id. For a discussion on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see infra Part VII. 
 215. Kemba J. Dunham, Reforms Turn Search for Directors Into a Long, Tedious 
Task, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at B1 (citing increased restrictions on 
independence, criminal liability, and disclosure as having contributed to the 
difficult task of attracting qualified board candidates). 
 216. Lisa Holton, Help Wanted: Filling Vacancies on Corporate Boards Creates 
Headaches for In-House Lawyers, 90 A.B.A. J. 30, 30 (2004) (stating that for small and 
midsized companies, recent corporate scandal and new governance rules that 
require increased independence have resulted in twice the director search time 
than that of ten years ago). 
 217. Dunham, supra note 215 at B1. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Tom Walsh, The 2003 Herald Hundred; Bears Settled in, at Home in 2002, 
BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 24, 2003, at 4 (naming Enron including Arthur Anderson, 
WorldCom, and Tyco as being major players in the corporate scandals of 2002). 
 221. Many, if not most, of the companies that would be affected are listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange. Thus, to get an idea of the number of companies 
that may be impacted, one can look at the more than 2800 companies listed on 
the NYSE.  New York Stock Exchange website, at http://www.nyse.com/listed/ 
p1020656067970.html?displayPage=%2Flisted%2F1020656067970.html (last 
visited April 18, 2004). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Comments of Securities and Exchange Commissioner Cynthia A. 
25
Sundquist: Proposal To Allow Shareholder Nomination of Corporate Directors:
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
SUNDQUIST-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  9:11 PM 
1496 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
C.  The SEC versus the State 
Any rule regarding shareholder rights traditionally has been 
left up to the state of incorporation to determine.224  The United 
States Supreme Court has weighed in on this topic, stating 
“[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit 
their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, 
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of 
directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the 
internal affairs of the corporation.”225  Under Minnesota law, it is 
the board of directors, and not the shareholders, that manage the 
business of the corporation.226  Foremost in this analysis is the fact 
that Minnesota law allows any requirements regarding director 
elections to be determined by the corporation.227  While not 
specifically addressed, the nomination of director candidates is 
certainly a requirement regarding the election of directors.228  
Thus, under Minnesota law, this leaves the nomination of directors 
up to the corporation.229 
Minnesota corporate law is unique in that it requires a majority 
vote for any director election.230  This invalidates one of the 
 
Glassman, Securities and Exchange Commission Open Meeting (Oct. 8, 2003), at 
23:35, at http://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings.shtml (last visited April 18, 
2004) [hereinafter SEC Open Meeting] (stating the best way to implement this 
proposal would be to “ferret out the complacent boards . . . and leave the effective 
boards alone.”). 
 224. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union of Am., Minn. Div. v. Farmers Educ. & Co-
op. Union of Am., 207 Minn. 80, 85, 289 N.W. 884, 886 (1940) (quoting 1 
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 194, Cmt. a, “[t]he existence and extent of the 
right of shareholders to control the actions of corporate officers or agents is 
determined by the law of the state of incorporation”). 
 225. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting Cort v. 
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975), emphasis in original); see Robert B. Thompson, 
Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, 
Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 222 (1999) (discussing federal law’s 
“respect” for state corporate law). 
 226. MINN. STAT. § 302A.201 subd. 1 (2003) (stating that the “business and 
affairs of a corporation shall by managed by or under the direction of a board”). 
 227. MINN. STAT. § 302A.205 (2003) (stating that under state law the only 
requirement is that directors be natural persons.  “The method of election and 
any additional qualifications for directors may be imposed by or in the manner 
provided in the articles or bylaws.”). 
 228. Id. 
 229. See id. 
 230. MINN. STAT. § 302A.437 (2003) (stating any action by the shareholders 
requires a majority vote).  The majority of states include a provision in their state 
corporate laws that allow for plurality voting in director elections.  See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 10-728 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-712 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
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Commission’s chief triggering events for the proposal—a 
substantial withhold vote.231  In Minnesota, a nominee for the board 
can be elected only after receiving a majority vote from the 
shareholders.232  Therefore, the concern expressed by the 
Commission, that a director may be elected without a majority vote, 
is not a reality in Minnesota.233 
A rule that allows shareholders direct access to a proxy 
statement for nomination purposes arguably could violate state law 
because state law grants nominations to the board.234  It has been 
argued that the core responsibility of the Commission is to regulate 
corporate disclosure rather than address substantive corporate law, 
which typically is a state law function.235  Indeed, the Commission 
 
607.0728 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-728  (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-
149 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-728 (2003); IND. CODE § 23-1-30-9 (2003); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 271B.7-280 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 730 (2003); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 79-4-7.28 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-531 (2003); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 21-2066 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:7.28 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 
60.251 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-280 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-209 
(2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 7.28 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-669 (2003); 
W.VA. CODE § 31D-7-728 (2003); WIS. STAT. § 180.0728 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
17-16-728 (2002) (all stating “[u]nless otherwise provided in the articles of 
incorporation, directors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares 
entitled to vote in the election at a meeting”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 subd. 3 
(2003) (stating “[d]irectors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares 
present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
6506 (2002) (stating “directors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the 
stockholders present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and 
entitled to vote on the election of directors.”); MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-
404 (2003) (stating “[u]nless the charter or bylaws of a corporation provide 
otherwise, a plurality of all the votes cast at a meeting at which a quorum is present 
is sufficient to elect a director”); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 450.1441 (2003) (providing a 
carve-out for director elections, stating a majority vote is required for all 
shareholder acts except a director election, where a plurality is needed to elect a 
director); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.265 (2003) (stating all shareholders actions must 
be approved by a majority vote except for director elections where a plurality vote 
is needed); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-11 (2003) (stating “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided by the certificate of incorporation, directors shall be elected by a 
plurality of the votes cast at an election.”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 614 (2003) 
(stating “[d]irectors shall, except as otherwise required by this chapter or by the 
certificate of incorporation as permitted by this chapter, be elected by a plurality 
of the votes cast at a meeting of shareholders”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18 § 1061 (2002) 
(stating directors must be elected by a plurality of the vote); TEX BUS. ORG. CODE 
ANN. § 21.359 (2003) (allowing the articles of incorporation to alter the state 
plurality vote rule for director elections). 
 231. October 14, 2003 Proposed Rule, supra note 136, at Part II.A.3.a. 
 232. MINN. STAT. § 302A.437 (2003). 
 233. See id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Bus. Roundtable v. S.E.C., 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C.Cir. 1990)(stating that 
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itself states that the federal securities laws “derive from a simple 
and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large 
institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain 
basic facts about an investment prior to buying it.”236 In order to 
accomplish this, the Commission requires “public companies to 
disclose meaningful financial and other information to the 
public.”237  A District of Columbia circuit court ruled in 1990 that a 
Commission rule regulating a substantive corporate governance 
issue was “far beyond the matters of disclosure.”238  A shareholder 
access rule can be characterized as a necessary and primary task of 
the board of directors that “is concededly a part of corporate 
governance traditionally left to the states.”239  Accordingly, a rule 
granting shareholder access is outside of the authority of the 
Commission and is better served by state law.240  If the proposed 
rule passes, it will surely be challenged as preempting state law, 
historically the domain of corporate law.241  One group already has 
threatened such a suit.242  Should the rule be adopted, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, a not-for-profit business federation, has 
stated it will explore taking the Commission to court.243  As outlined 
in the argument above, the trade group’s position is that the 
Commission lacks the authority to regulate the nomination and 
election of board candidates and that such authority should be left 
to the individual states.244 
VII. RECOMMENDATION—ALLOW TIME FOR RECENT REGULATIONS 
Reacting to a year of major corporate scandal, in 2002 
 
“the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include regulation of an issue that is 
so far beyond matters of disclosure”). 
 236. Introduction—The SEC: Who We Are, What We Do, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission website, at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
(last visited April 18, 2004). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 408. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 411 (quoting a 1934 Senate Report, stating that when enacting the 
Exchange Act of 1934, Congress did not intend for the Commission to have the 
authority or “power to interfere in the management of corporations”). 
 241. Comments of Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, SEC Open Meeting, supra 
note 223, at 48:48 (questioning whether the SEC has the ability to impose 
substantive rules outside of disclosure provisions). 
 242. Phil McCarty, SEC’s Proxy Plan Threatened with Suit by Business Chamber, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at A6. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
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Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Sarbanes”).245  Sarbanes 
has caused major changes in corporate governance law.246  
Addressing what it believed to be defective corporate governance 
laws, Congress enacted a number of provisions that dictate how a 
corporation should be managed.247  Specific attention was paid to a 
corporation’s audit committee.248  These corporate governance 
reforms were focused on audit committees to strengthen the 
committee’s role as a “watchdog” of the corporation.249  An audit 
committee is responsible for the supervision of all outside 
accounting and auditing.250  Sarbanes requires that the entire audit 
committee be independent and that no audit committee director 
can be “an affiliated person of the issuer.”251  This means that an 
audit committee member cannot be an executive officer or 
employee of the company, or hold more than 10% stock in the 
company.252  Congress enacted this provision in an attempt to 
remedy recent “financial scandals.”253  This goal is exactly the same 
as one of the goals the shareholder nomination proposal is 
attempting to achieve.254 
Sarbanes has been called “the most sweeping corporate 
regulatory statute since the Great Depression.”255  While that fact is 
important, it is even more crucial to realize that Sarbanes is still 
being implemented.256  Many of these regulations have not yet 
 
 245. Niels Schaumann, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Bird’s-Eye View, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1317 (2004).  Sarbanes is a large and comprehensive Act that, in 
summary, involves the regulation of accounting practices, audit committees, 
director independence, professional conduct for lawyers, financial statement 
certification, disclosure requirements, and corporate management. Id. 
 246. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New 
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1142 (2003) (stating that 
Sarbanes “straightforwardly works significant changes in corporate governance of 
public corporations”). 
 247. Schaumann, supra note 245, at 1317. 
 248. Id. at 1340. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Sta. 745, 775-
776 (2002) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (amending the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A(m)(1)(A)). 
 252. Schaumann, supra note 245, at 1342 n.148. 
 253. Id. at 1322. 
 254. July 15, 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 1, at 5 (stating a majority of 
comments on the proposal expressed concern over recent corporate scandals). 
 255. Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A Political Economy of Issuer 
Choice in International Securities Regulation,  2002 WIS. L. REV. 1363, 1433 n.8 (2002). 
 256. Schaumann, supra note 245, at 1317 (stating that while many rules have 
been adopted, some are still pending). 
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become effective and some of the changes have not even yet been 
adopted.257  The impact and long-term effect of this “record-level” 
new set of regulations is still to be determined.258 
On November 4, 2003, the Commission adopted a final set of 
corporate governance rules regulating all companies that list on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).259  Among the rules 
adopted: regulations that require a majority of a company’s board 
to consist of independent directors, tighter restrictions on the 
definition of “independent,” and requirements for companies to 
adopt and disclose guidelines for corporate governance, business 
conduct, and ethics.260  While Sarbanes considered a major set of 
governance rules, the NYSE rules are even more restrictive than 
Sarbanes and further enhance the corporate governance practices 
of American companies.261  Furthermore, these rules were just put 
into place in November 2003.262  Like Sarbanes, the impact and 
effectiveness of these rules, whether negative or positive, has yet to 
be determined. 
The Commission has been in this position before.  In 1980, the 
Commission decided against proposing and implementing a 
shareholder access rule despite the urgings of a large shareholder 
voice.263  The Commission instead decided to allow the emerging 
concept of nominating committees to be fully implemented before 
enacting any further regulations regarding director elections.264  
With ongoing implementation of Sarbanes regulations, the recent 
adoption of the New York Stock Exchange rules, and the recent 
 
 257. Comments of Broc Romanek, Chair, Corporate & Securities Law 
Committee, The American Corporate Counsel Association (June 13, 2003), at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/ acca061303.htm (last visited April 18, 
2004). 
 258. Id. 
 259. New York Stock Exchange, Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules 
(Nov. 4, 2003) codified as Section 303A in the NYSE Listed Company Manual, at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last visited April 18, 2004). 
 260. Id. § 303A(1) (requiring “listed companies” to have majority of 
independent directors on their boards); § 303A(2) (defining “independent 
director” as a director who has no material relationship with the listed company); 
§ 303A(9) (stating listed companies must adopt and disclose corporate 
governance guidelines); § 303A(10) (requiring listed companies to implement 
guidelines for business conduct and ethics). 
 261. Andrew Countryman, U.S. OKs Governance Rules for Listing on Exchanges, 
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2003, at 1 (stating the “new rules go beyond [Sarbanes]”). 
 262. Id. 
 263. See supra note 29. 
 264. Id. 
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nominating committee enhancements,265 the Commission finds 
itself in a familiar position.  The changes in 1980 were not nearly as 
vast and significant as Sarbanes.266  Yet in 1980, the Commission 
decided it needed to allow those changes to be implemented and 
evaluate their impact before implementing further corporate 
governance regulations.267  That is exactly the path the Commission 
should now take regarding shareholder nominations. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Currently there appears to be a feeling in this country that if 
corporate America opposes something, it must be good for 
shareholders.268  However, if a rule imposes a misdirected 
regulation on a corporation that limits its “competitiveness,” that is 
good for no one.269  That is especially true if the rule, under the 
guise of “corporate democracy,” actually benefits only a few major 
shareholders who are under no duty to the corporation.  The 
corporate scandals of 2002270 were no doubt harmful for 
shareholders, both in terms of trust and personal investment, but 
there is vast legislation addressing these scandals.  That legislation 
needs time to work.  Furthermore, regulation of director elections 
historically has been left to the individual states.  While the 
intentions behind corporate democracy are commendable, they are 
misguided in the realm of shareholder nominations.  “Even though 
our intentions are good, . . . the consequences of being wrong 
could be very serious,” one SEC Commissioner recently said.271  
Let’s not overreact to the crimes of a few companies by punishing 
all companies. 
 
 
 265. See supra note 63. 
 266. Sarbanes has been called “the broadest and farthest-reaching securities 
reform legislation since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” Schaumann, supra 
note 245, at 1349-50. 
 267. See supra note 29. 
 268. Comments of Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Open Meeting, 
supra note 223, at 24:28. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Enron, WorldCom, et al.  See supra note 220. 
 271. Comments of Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Open Meeting, 
supra note 223, at 28:20. 
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